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In this paper I intend to discuss the relationship between u'nderstanding, 
truth , and explanation, starting from the problem of the interpretation of 
alien belief systems. T he examination of this will lead us to present an 
analysis of the structure of understanding, and to defend its cognitive 
universality in so far as any identification of reality reproduces the 
structure of the process of understanding. This cognitive universality does 
not necessarily exclude, however, the possibility of reducing understanding 
to causal relations. With respect to this, I shall discuss the plausibi~ity of 
the views of Quine, Searle and Davidson on the kind of relation that holds 
between cognitive processes and the causal relations in nature. In my 
opinion, Quine's position is untenable; Scarle's view, if non-trivially 
interpreted, is at least implausible; and , finally, Davidson's anomalous 
monism can be construed in such a way that it is compatible with our 
analysis of the structure of understanding and with the thesis of its 
cognitive universality, in spite of D avidson's commitment to the ontological 
universality of causal relations. 
I 
In 1935, Evans-Pritchard wrote: 
Scientific notions are those which accord with reality both with regard 
to the validity of their premisses and to the inferences drawn from their 
propositions ... . Logical notions are those in which according to the 
rules of thought inferences would be true were the premisses true, the 
truth of the premisses being irrelevant. 
A pot has broken during firing. This is probably due to grit. Let us 
examine the pot and see if this is the cause. T hat is logical and scientific 
thought. Sickness is due to witchcraft. A man is sick. Let us consult the 
oracles to discover who is the witch responsible. That is logical and 
unscientific thought. 1 
By introducing this double criterion of rationality to evaluate any 
system of belief, Evans-Pritchard sought to mark himself off from certain 
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th,inkers who interpreted ma~eal beliefs as b&sically contradictor/ and 
who, .thereby, attributed aQ illogical system otJ;hougbt to cef,tain c~ltures , 
Against such a position Evan,s-:Pritcfiard :field that magic~\ beliefs are 
internally coherent. However he was less generous when it came to 
evaluating the truth of such beliefs, since he ciDnsidered the premises upon 
which magical beliefs are based to be strictly false in so far as they do not 
match rea1ity. In this way Evans-}>ritchard seems to be following the 
positivist model of rationality, according to which any system of belief is to 
be evaluated by just' two criteria, namely, its internal coherence and its 
truth, the latter understood as correspondence with reality. 
However, just as we are right to feel suspicious about any interpretation 
which considers a system of thought as fundamentally incoherent, so too 
we should be loath to accept a standpoint which views magical thought 
(which has, after all, been adopted by a very considerable proportion of 
humanity throughout history) as being based on premises which are strictly 
false. Doubts such as these have led certain philosophers to propose a 
different strategy when faced with the problem of interpreting magical 
beliefs. Broadly speaking, we can say that whereas in the past thinkers. 
started from the assumption that the positivist criteria of rationality were 
l,lniversally valid, and went on to disqualify any model of thought which did 
( not fit in with them, today one tends to begin with the assumption that all 
\ ,models of thought are basically rational, and go on from there to determine 
the specific criteria of rationality behind each model. 
This new strategy has emerged from a revision of the positivist analysis 
of the notion of reality. Thus, in the text of Evans-Pritchard, the word 
'reality' seems to be used to refer to some element external to thought and 
to language with which different beliefs are to be compared in order to 
determine their truth. Now, if such a comparison is to be possible, we must 
be able to identify both of its terms independently. So Evans-Pritchard 
seems to assume that it is possible to identify reality without our , 
identification being biased through its commitment to a particular language 
or system of thought. Let us examine to what extent such an assumption is 
valid. 
Establishing the identity of objects entails the notion of a rule, since, 
given the infinite aspects under which we may consider an object, we need 
a rule to determine precisely those aspects which are to be considered 
relevant for maintaining the numerical and qualitative identity of a given 
object. Furthermore, as different communities can follow different rules to 
establish what is real, we seem to be forced to conclude that in spite of the 
positivists' claim any identification of reality is conditioned by the system 
of rules in accordance with which it has been carried out. Consequently 
one cannot naively maintain that the way science characterizes reality is 
linguistically unconditioned, and so it is not possible to claim that it can be 
used as the universal criterion of validity for all systems of belief. 
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This approach seems to lead to conclusions which are intuitively as 
paradoxical as those which followed from the universalisation o f the 
positivist criteria o f rationality , since now we find ourselves with no criteria 
whatsoever with which to compare the rationality o f different systems of 
belief. Full-blooded relativism is just as suspect as is the assumption that 
until recently all human thought had basically been a mistake. I shall 
endeavour to offer an analysis o f the interpretation of alien systems of 
belief, which will enable us to elude both full-blooded relativism and na'ive 
universalism. 3 
Let us first consider what is involved in the process of identifying a 
system of belief. The idea of a system of belief presupposes the idea o f a 
subject to whom this belief is attributed. Now I think that it can be shown 
that when attributing beliefs to a subject, one must start from two basic 
assumptions: a) that the subject's beliefs are basically coherent, and b) that 
when the subject holds a set of beliefs he is also committed to the belief 
that it is, in general, rational to hold this set of beliefs. 
With respect to (a) , it seems clear that it makes no sense to claim that a 
subject maintains a basically contradictory system of beliefs, since to 
maintain contradictory beliefs amounts to not maintaining any belier' at all 
or, if one prefers, to maintain ing just any belief. Thus, if the beliefs 
identified as contradictory belonged to the core of a belief system, then the 
rest of the beliefs would lose their content, and we would no longer be 
entitled to say that they are beliefs at all. As a result , one a priori 
assumption underlying every process of identification of beliefs is that the 
subject's beliefs arc basically coherent. Whence it follows that any 
interpretation which presents a system of belief as basically self-contradic-
tory is, in fact, an interpretation that has identified the contents o f the 
beliefs incorrectly. 4 
As regards (b) , we must bear in mind that in saying that a subject 
believes something, we arc saying that the subject believes something 
about reality. Now, believing something about reality implies believing 
that a statement is true; but holding a statement to be true implies the 
ability, on the part of the subject, to distinguish between evidence that will 
back up, and evidence that will question, his commitment to his belief. It 
follows from this that a subject's commitment to the truth rather than to 
the falsehood of a statement cannot be, in the majority of cases,· arbitrary. 
The subject must have some reason however vague to adopt a belief and, 
moreover , the subject must be able to consider new reasons which could 
lead him to modify his commitment to the truth of the statement in 
question . Therefore one cannot determine the reasons for holding a belief 
without discriminating between what constitutes and what does not 
constitute a reason for believing something. But this is the same as 
distinguishing between good reasons and bad reasons for believing 
something. The idea o f a reason for believing is intrinsically normative. 
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Nevertheless, this normativity commits not only the subject who is being 
interpreted, but the interpreter himself, since in the process of identifying 
beliefs he must be committed to the statement that certain reasons do 
justify certain beliefs. I 
A gainst this line of argument one could object that it relies on anl 
excessively rationalist conception of the adoption of beliefs and that, in 
fact, most of the beliefs held by a subject are merely the result of a process 
of social ization, and so do not obey any type of reason but are due to social 
conditioning. There is .a sense in which I believe that this objection is 
correct , since I do not wish to deny the influence of the social or cultural 
context in which an individual develops on the beliefs he holds to be true. 
However, this conditioning does not necessarily alter the fact that, in l 
gene ral, the subject must consider it rational to adopt the beliefs that, 
conditioned by his cultural context, he does in fact adopt. It could be 
argued that in some cases we can meaningfully say that a given subject 
becomes committed to a system of belief without the intervention of any 
rational element whatsoever. Nonetheless, I think that such a description 
of the situation would be confusing, and it would be better characterized as 
an extreme case in which we should recognise our failure to identify the 
subject's beliefs. 
A different objection to my argument would be to claim that the 
interpreter does not need to take on such strong commitments, but that he 
need only identify what constitutes a good reason for the subject, regardless 
of wlhetheyit also constitutes a good reason for the interpreter. H owever we 
can only refer to the particular criteria of rationality of a subject if we have 
previously \ietermined his system of belief, since this is the only way we 
shall be able to distinguish between what constitutes a good reason for him 
and what constitutes a good reason for us. Consequently in order to 
identify a system of belief one cannot start from what is peculiar to that 
system, since, ex hypothesi, we do not know its content at the very 
beginning of the interpretation. This is why in the initial stages of any 
process of interpretation the notions of a reason and a good reason for 
believing must necessarily refer to a shared rationality , common to the 
interpreter and to the subject who is being interpreted. 
We may conclude that every interpretation of an alien system of belief 
must start off by assuming the basically rational character of the system in 
question; that is to say, by assuming that a subject will only commit himself 
to be liefs which are basically coherent and which , moreover , he has in 
general good reasons to uphold. At the beginning of the interpretation the 
subject must be supposed to have 'good reasons' , and not only ' reasons', to 
commit himself to certain beliefs because the rationality, which is 
necessarily presupposed at this stage of the process, cannot be peculiar to 
the subject's system of belief but must be shared by the interpreter and the 
subject. This is so because it is only by making this initial assumption that 
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we can come to discover what is peculiar to the other system of belief, and 
thus appreciate certain incongruities in the system and distinguish between 
belie fs for which the subject has good reasons and those which he holds for 
bad reasons or for no reason whatsoever. 
This shared rationality should not, needless to say, be understood in a 
rationalist sense. It should not be thought to imply the possibility of 
making explicit a universal standard of rationality which could be used to 
evaluate the rationality of any system of belief. For , in the process of 
interpretation, the content of such a standard of rationality can only be 
fixed by agreement about the rationality of certain beliefs ,· and not vice 
versa. Thus it is the agreement between the interpreter and the subject 
with respect to ce rtain judgements, and not a supposed universal standard, 
which constitutes the core of the rationality which they must, perforce, 
share. Now this agreement in judgements, which is a necessary condition 
for all interpretation, will include, as we have seen, not only the idea of a 
common logic, but also that of a partially shared characterization of reality , 
precisely in so far as the attribution of beliefs depends on establishing what 
is true. 
All of this enables us to see that in all interpretation there is an element 
shared by both the interpreter and the subject, as well as some elements 
which are peculiar to one or the other. These unshared elements stem from 
the fact that each subject shapes his particular conception of reality from 
his specific language, from within his own historically defined culture; in 
other words, he defines what is real and what is unreal within his own 
network of assumptions. The shared element , on the other hand, accounts 
for those conditions which must hold if the interpreter and the person 
being interpreted are to recognise each other as subjects holding beliefs; in 
short, as subjects. 
If we now examine in slightly more detail how these two elements are 
related, we shall see that the process of interpretation is not merely a way 
of de termining the contents of another subject's judgements, but is also a 
means of determining reality in so far as the interpreter himself may be 
forced to revise his own conception of reality. 
n 
Let us, then, consider the case of an interpreter T who seeks to interpret 
the system of belief SB of a subject S, to see how the process of 
interpretation develops. The first thing that the interpreter T has to take 
into accoun t is the verbal behaviour (VB . 1, VB.2 , ••• VB.n) of S together 
with the circumstances which surround it (C. 1, C.2, ••• , C.n)· 
Let us suppose that T begins his enquiry by interpreting VB .• , and thus 
that he does not yet understand to rest of S's verbal behaviour. Here we 
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come up against our first problem, since, according to the pr~vious secti?n, 
a correct interpretaHon ofVB. 1 mustlform a part of a general mterpretat10n 
which makes S's overall linguistic behaviour appear basically coherent and 
maximally true. Consequently we shall only be able to judge how correct 
the proposed interpretation of VB. 1 is afte;. working out a complete 
interpretation of all of S's verbal behaviour; but, obviously, we cannot 
reach this exhaustive interpretation unless we have previously established 
the meaning of each individual instance of his verbal behaviour. So the 
interpretation seems to be moving in a circle we cannot get out of, nor even 
get in ·to. · 
The only device available to T which will allow him to break into the 
hermeneutical circle is his own network of assumptions. Since the 
interpreter must assume, at first, that his own network of assumptions has 
some basic e lements in common with that of the subject he is interpreting, 
and since he must interpret the subject's behaviour optimizing its 
rationality, then the only strategy he can follow in order to fulfil these two 
requirements is to interpret VB. 1 in such a way that it fits in with his own 
system of belief. In doing this, the interpreter is using the meaning of the 
totality of his own linguistic behaviour to anticipate the meaning of the 
whole of S's linguistic behaviour. 
Needless to say, as the interpreter comes across new instances of the 
verbal behaviour of S, he may be led to revise the meaning he initially 
attributed to VB. 1, and so to revise his interpretation of S's global 
linguistic behaviour; as a result of which T might discover that certain 
assumptions from which he was forced to start turn out to be illegitimate in 
that they are distorting his interpretation. However, since the interpreter 
must elucidate the truth of what S says, he might well discover not only this 
misunderstanding, but also _that some of his (the interpreter's) assumptions 
were false; that is to say, (pmtitutcd an incorrect representation of reality. 
This is so because the dia~ogue he has set up with the subject forces the 
interpreter to re-examine the rationality of his own beliefs and assumptions 
in the light of the subject's remarks and judgements in so far as the 
interpretation is, perforce, committed to clarifying what constitutes a good 
reason for believing something about reality. 
Thus, we can see that interpretation is not only a way of determining 
the beliefs of another subject, it is also a way of establishing what is real, 
what judge ments arc true . In this sense I think one can maintain that 
interpretation and understanding are structured like what may be termed 
an open dialogue: that is, a dialogue between two subjects, which, starting 
from partially shared networks of assumptions, is oriented towards 
establishing what is true, as this is the only way of determining the content 
of the other's judgements. In such a dialogue the possibility of revising the 
assumptions of either subject must of course always be left open. 
This process of determining what is true will never come to an end , 
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since reality is always viewed from a historically defined perspective. One 
can always transcend one's own perspective by establishing a dialogue with 
other historically conditioned perspectives. In this way, the structure of 
understanding is more akin to a spiral than to a circle, since it never returns 
to its starting point but, moving from the whole to the part and from the 
part to the whole, is continually advancing towards an unattainable and a 
priori indeterminable end. 
Be that as it may, our recognition of the historical nature of every 
characterization of reality or of truth should not lead us to overlook a 
decisive feature of the semantics of the words 'real' and 'true': when we say 
that such and such really is the case, or when we affirm that a statement is 
true, we are not only committed to its being real or true for me, for us, or 
for us and for you, but we are also assuming that its truth can be 
maintained beyond any particular epistemological perspective. 
Now, given the historical nature of every characterization of reality, of 
what is true, how can this system-independent feature of the notions of 
truth and reality be incorporated into our analysis of understanding? I 
think this feature can be incorporated only if we consider it as if it were the 
result of a hypothetical idealized agreement about truth, which, although 
historically unattainable, serves as a guide or point of reference for all 
cognitive processes. On such a view the question of whether reality is 
interpreted as a noumenal entity present in each historical moment or as a 
regulative idea is irrelevant, since in both cases the notion of reality is 
fulfilling the same epistemological function, that of guiding knowledge; 
and it makes no sense, in either case, to talk of its complete characterization 
at any moment in history. For, although truth is not a contingent property 
of a statement, and although the identity of what is real is not conditioned 
by our historically determined knowledge, nevertheless the affirmation 
that a statement is true and the identification of what is real are historically 
conditioned, so that in principle any historical agreement about truth or 
the identity of what is real is subject to revision. 
The fact that every historical characterization of what is real is carried 
out from within a network of assumptions which is shared by a particular 
community of subjects implies that every cognitive process reproduces the 
structure of understanding. Thus advances in scientific knowledge, in the 
form of causal explanations of events, cannot be thought of as being 
independent of the processes of understanding. The reason for this is clear 
if we remember that the scientific system of belief must demonstrate its 
rationality in a d ialogue with other belief systems and must thereby accept 
the possibility of discovering, within this dialogical process, the irrationality 
of some of its assumptions. Moreover the same situation holds, though 
perhaps less obviously, within the scientific system of belief itself, since the 
content and the determination of the truth of a scientific theory cannot be 
thought of as independent of the agreement existing among the members 
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of a scientific community about what constitutes evidence for or ag~inst the 
theory. Even in the case in which, at the outset, we share a constderable 
number of assumptions, this agreement should be understood as the result 
of an open dialogue aimed at establishing what is real. For here too we 
must reckon with the possibility that someone might challenge the 
rationality of these initial assumptions when determining the content and 
truth of a scientific theory. Consequently understanding, conceived of as 
an open dialogue, can be regarded as a cognitive structure presupposed in 
every attempt to characterize what is real; and it is precisely in this sense 
that we can speak of the cognitive universality of understanding, as 
opposed to the particularity of any other feature of a given cognitive 
structure. 
Finally, we can now see that the basic error of positivist anthropology 
seems to lie in its failure to realise that its commitment to a causal 
explanation of reality meant that its vision of reality was historically 
conditioned by a definite network of assumptions. This is why the positivist 
anthropologist did not feel it necessary to bring into the open his own 
assumptions or to revise his own view of reality as the result of his dialogue 
with other cultures. 
m 
The recognition of the cognitive universality of understanding and, 
therefore, of the fact that the scientific characterization · of reality 
reproduces the general structure of understanding, does not necessarily 
rule out the possibility of offering a causal explanation of understanding 
itself. 
One could argue, accepting all that has been said in the previous 
section, that at a certain mometft_ in history the dialogical process of 
knowledge reaches a conception ot\reality according to which reality is 
constituted only by sequences of events which may be causally explained, 
so that understanding itself might also be explained causally. In this way 
advances in the historical dialogue to determine what is true could lead us 
to revise our analysis of the structure of this open dialogue. 
However, the possibility of offering a causal explanation of under-
standing can be interpreted in various ways: 
(1) The processes of understanding can be identified within a theory which 
employs only physical terms (excluding mental or linguistic ones). As a 
result cognitive processes, in so far as they can be identified in physical 
terms, may be subsumed under general laws and thus be causally 
explained. 
(2) Cognitive processes can be identified only in mental or linguistic terms, 
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but this does not exclude a priori the possibility of setting up type-type 
correlations between classes of events identified in physical terms and 
classes of events identified in linguistic terms. 
(3) Cognitive processes can be identified only in mental or linguistic terms, 
and it is not possible to establish strict nomological correlations between 
types of events identified in physical terms and types of events identified in 
linguistic terms. This, however, does not prevent us from maintaining that 
each particular linguistic event is identical to a particular physical event, 
and that different linguistic events cannot be identical to the same physical 
event. Thus all events arc physical, although some arc' also linguistic. Now, 
as all physical events have a description which enables us to subsume them 
under a strict law, we can say that all events qua physical events are liable 
to causal explanations. 
I shall now try to show that the first view is untenable; that the second, 
if interpreted non-trivially, is implausible; and, finally, that the third can be 
interpreted in such a way that it is compatible with the idea of the cognitive 
universality of understanding. 
I think that Quine is committed to the fi rst view when he maintains, in 
Word and Object, that it is possible to identify the meaning of a sentence by 
identifying the speaker's disposi tions, so that a speaker's linguistic 
behaviour could be explained in dispositional terms. 
The attribution of dispositions presupposes, for Quine, the existence of 
structural relations between certain physical elements, the knowledge of 
which would enable us to explain in nomological terms what we are 
currently able to explain only in terms of dispositions. As a result , the fact 
that dispositional sentences take the subjunctive conditional form does not 
make them especially unmanageable as it is possible, by definition, to 
establish systematic relations between their truth and the truth of certain 
indicative conditionals: 
Dispositions are, we see, a better-behaved lot than the general run of 
subjunctive conditionals; ·and the reason is that they are conceived as 
built-in, enduring structural traits. Their saving grace extends, 
moreover, to many subjunctive conditionals that do not happen to 
have acquired one-word tags like 'soluble' and 'fragile'. An example 
was the 'would prompt assent' of§ 8. For there again a disposition was 
concerned, albeit unnamed: some subtle neural condition, induced by 
language-learning, that disposes the subject to assent to or dissent 
from a certain sentence in response to certain supporting stimulations. 5 
Yet, given the normative character of language, the basic assumption 
from which Quine starts in order to identify the meaning of sentences is, in 
principle, problematic. We h ave already seen that identifying a piece of 
behaviour as linguistic behaviour implies the possibility of evaluating it as 
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ration~l or irrational, as coherent or incoherent, as tight or wrong; by · 
contrast, a dispositional characterization of a physical process rules out any 
question of it.s rationaUty_, since it is meaningless to ask about the 
coherence or incoherence of a physical process. €onsequently a dispo-
sitional approach has to demonstrate that ~t is possible to identify linguistic 
behaviour without introducing any nqrmative element. 
One attempt to do this is to resort to the ootion of 'uni formity of 
behaviour' as a variation on the notidn 'agreement in judgements'. For 
Wittgenstein, agreement in judgements was at the bottom of all appraisals 
of the rationality of verbal behaviour, so the question of the rationality of 
this agreement simply could not be raised; why not then understand this 
agreement as empirical, thereby reducing the normativity of language to 
the uniformity of behaviour? In other words, why not reduce rule following 
to a question of behaviour in accordance with a rule? 
The problem with this line of argument is that the mere identification of 
certain regularities of behaviour does not seem to constitute a criterion for 
identifying an agreement in judgements. If, in the context of a scientific 
conception of the world, an observer were to confine himself to describing 
all the regularities of nature, he would find nothing that could be termed 
linguistic behaviour.6 To discover the existence of an agreement in 
judgements one must start from a network of assumptions which must 
include, apart from the idea of an object, that of a subject. For to discovef< 
an agreement in judgements is to discover an agreement in judgements on 
the part of certain subjects. In other words, the discovery that a subject has 
expressed a judgement with a certain content can only be made, as I tried 
to show before, by another subject who enters into an open dialogue with 
him about the rationality of his judgements. Thus a purely causal system of 
representation cannot identify the existence of linguistic communication, 
because to do so one must resort to notions which cannot be defined in 
physical terms, since they are intelligible ~rrly from the point of view of a 
dialogue between subjects and not from that of a subject observing an 
object. Accordingly, we can say that agreement in judgements is not an 
empirical fact in the sense that it is not a fact of nature; that is, it is not a 
fact that can be identified from the epistemological point of view of an 
external observer of objects. 
j_ 
Searle, who in Intentionality defends thesis (2), acknowledges that it is . 
imposs ible to identify linguistic behaviour if one uses only terms belonging 
to the level of physical description. Nevertheless this does not prevent him 
from accepting the existence of causal relations between events identified 
on different levels of description, nor, therefore, from admitting the 
possibility of offering a causal explanation of linguistic behaviour by 
resorting to events identified in physical terms. 
Indeed, establishing causal relations between events which have been 
identified on different levels of description is a straightforward, everyday 
28 
_L 
Understanding, truth, and explanation 
practice. Scarle mentions the case of the relations established between the 
macroscopic and molecular descriptions of substances. Water, for example, 
is, macroscopically, a liquid; but, from a molecular point of view, it is a set 
of H20 molecules. There is nothing about the molecular properties of water 
that would enable us to identify it as a liquid; if we wish to do so, we must 
resort to a different system of representation. Nevertheless, the fact that 
macroscopic and microscopic properties of a substance belong to different 
..levels of description does not bar us from affirming the existence of causal 
relations between the two levels; for a causal relation qbviously exists 
between the molecular structure of water and its liquidity. Now, if this is so 
in the case of water, Searle asks why we should consider more problematic 
the existence of causal relations between our linguistic behaviour and the 
physical properties of our brain: 
Singular causal statements do not entail that there is a universal causal 
regularity which they instantiate, but the concept of efficient causation 
whether intentional or not, only has applicability in a universe where a 
high degree of causal regularity is presupposed.7 
In principle one could argue against this that we arc justified in saying 
that there arc causal relations between the macroscopic and molecular 
properties of water because nomological relations between the two types of 
properties are known; but we do not know of the existence of any such 
relations between the physical properties of the brain and linguistic 
behaviour. 
Scarle holds that such an objection is based on a false supposition, 
namely that in order to establish the existence of causal relations between 
two types of phenomena it is necessary to be able to subsume these 
relations under general causal laws. However for Searle it is not necessary 
to know these general laws, nor even to assume that they can be known: 
simply supposing a high degree of causal regularity to exist in the world is 
enough to allow us to admit the existence of causal relations. 
Moreover this assumed regularity has allowed us · to discover a wide 
range of causal regularities that link up physical phenomena with mental or 
linguistic phenomena. Indeed, it is absurd to deny the existence of causal 
regularities between certain parts of structures of the brain and certain 
linguistic abilities, and we can be confident that thanks to advances in 
neuroscience we shall increase the scope and precision of our description of 
such regularities. According to Searle, one cannot set a priori bounds on 
such advances in knowledge: 
And while there are no 'strict' laws, there are Jots of causal regularities 
in the operation of Intentional causation, e.g., prior intentions cause 
actions, thirst causes drinking, visual experiences cause beliefs. It 
remains an open empirical question how these higher-level states are 
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realized in and caused by the operations of the brain, and an open 
question which of the realizatiohs are 'type-type' and which are 'token~ 
token'. The 'a priofi' arguments that I have seen against the possibility_ 
of type, rather than of token, realizations tend to neglect a crucial · 
point: what counts as a type is always relative to a description. The fact 
that we can't get type-type realizations stated in, for example, 
chemical terms, does not imply that we can't have type-type 
realizations at all. 8 
j_ 
Of course I do not wish to deny the important role that our increasing 
knowledge in the field of neurophysiology has to play in determining the 
relations between linguistic behaviour and the physical world, nor do I 
seek to rule out the possibility of establishing certain approximate 
generalizations which link up these two spheres. Nevertheless none of this · 
seems to affect the core of our argument, since the parallelism that Searle 
proposes comes to an end precisely at the point which most interests us: 
does there exist an a priori reason to rule out the existence of nomological 
causal relations between the states of our brain and linguistic behaviour, ' 
relations of the kind that exist between the macroscopic and microscopic 
properties of water? I think that Searle's parallelism does not answer this 
question, All his argument shows is that there is no reason to doubt the 
existence of causal relations between the brain and linguistic behaviour in 
so far as we presuppose a high degree of regularity in the relations existing 
between both type of phenomena; but he offers no evidence to show that, 
as happens in the case of water, we are dealing with causal relations which 
we can subsume under general causal laws. 
I believe that it can be shown that there are a priori reasons for 
maintaining that the causal relations between the macroscopic and · 
microscopic properties of water must be of a different kind from those 
which hold between the brain and linguistic behaviour, and that it would be 
difficult to claim that nomological causal r~t_ions may be established 
between the latter two. This fact, far from being trivial, shows the limits of 
what the study of nature can teach us about li1\guistic communication, 
To begin with one could point out that the analogy pursued by Searle 
does not take into account the specific character of the criteria for 
identifying linguistic behaviour as opposed to the criteria for identifying 
the properties of water, since, although we must acknowledge with Searle 
that the macroscopic and microscopic properties of water belong to · 
different levels of description, we should not lose sight of the fact that in , 
both cases we are dealing with physical properties of objects which may be 
identified by an external observer. With the introduction of linguistic 
properties on the other hand we must, as I claimed in section II , abandon 
the observational point of view and adopt the internal perspective of one 
subject interacting with another. Thus we may say that whereas we may: 
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observe both the molecular structure and the liquidity of water, we cannot 
observe linguistic behaviour externally. Consequently, if Searle's analogy 
is to have any force at this point, he would have to show that the specific 
character of the criteria for identifying linguistic behaviour is not 
incompatible with the possibility of establishing nomological causal 
relations between the brain and language. But I have not found any 
argument which could show this. 
In thesis (3) I briefly outlined Davidson's view of the relationship 
between physical and mental events, which he terms 'anomalous monism'. 
I shall now seek to offer an interpretation of this position which makes it 
compatible with the thesis of the cognitive universality of understanding, 
although I must say that I do not know how far Davidson would go along 
with my interpretation. 
Davidson maintains that mental events are anomalous precisely in the 
sense that they cannot be reduced to physical events, either in the sense of 
thesis (1) or in that of thesis (2). Thus it would notbe possible, according 
to Davidson, either to define mental events in physical terms or to establish 
causal relations which instantiate strict general laws between events 
identified within a physical system of description and events identified 
within a mental system of description. Furthermore, the anomalism of 
mental events entails the anomalism of linguistic behaviour since, for 
Davidson, mental and linguistic events are identified by the same kind of 
criteria, to such an extent that a detailed identification of a subject's mental 
events depends on the identification of the meaning of the sentences that 
he utters, and vice versa. 
Now, along with the anomalous character of mental events, Davidson 
defends a m6nist view with respect to the identity of events. He sharply 
distinguishes between the identity of events and their different possible 
true descriptions. From an ontological point of view, Davidson upholds the 
physical character of all events; but, as regards the different descriptions of 
events, he recognizes that the mental system of description cannot be 
reduced to the physical system of description. This dichotomy allows a 
non-exclusive characterization of the distinction between physical and 
mental events in the field of description. Thus, an event will be mental if 
and only if it has a mental description, that is, a description including verbs 
which express prepositional attitudes; on the other hand an event will be 
physical if a nd only if it can be identified in physical terms. Accordingly it is 
quite licit to affirm that a given event is, at the same time, mental and 
physical, since the fact that it has a mental description does not rule out the 
possibility of its being identified in physical terms. Consequently Davidson 
is able to defend a non-reductionist thesis about the physical identity of 
mental events, since now it is possible to claim that all mental events are 
physical without questioning the anomalism of the events described in 
mental terms. 
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Furthermore the monist thesis seems to entail a certain cognitive 
universality of causal explanations, since all events, in so far as they can be 
identified physically, can be causally explained. But this corollary is 
perfectly compatible with the cognitive universality of understanding. For 
it does not affect the possibility of claiming that all cognitive processes, in 
so far as they must be identified as such within an anomalous system of 
description, must reproduce the genera!"structure of understanding that I 
put forward in section Il. Of course this general structure will be present in 
the network of assumptions within which causal explanations are proposed, 
although we should also attribute a certain universality to that more 
particular cognitive structure presupposed in causal explanations, in so far 
as we are committed to the ontological universality of causal relations. 
j_ 
On the other hand it is possible to accept the idea of the identity of , 
events as being completely independent of any particular system of 
identification without rejecting one of the basic theses of our analysis of: 
understanding, namely that every identification of reality is carried out 
from within a historically conditioned network of assumptions. This is so 
because the identity of events can be understood, within our analysis, as a 
guide to every process of determining what is real. Indeed I do not see how 
we could eliminate this ideal character of the notions of truth and reality in 
so far as we recognize that the idea of holding a statement to be true 
depends on the notion of evidence, and that we must always leave open the 
possibility of revising our decision to hold certain evidence to be conclusive 
evidence for a given statement.9 
Finally, I would like to insist upon the fact that the historical awareness 
that we have gained in recognising that every process of identification is 
historically conditioned also affects ontology, understood as the discipline 
that endeavours to elucidate the basic categories of reality. Thus 
Davidson's claim that the world is made up of particular events which are 
causally related is a claim which, like any other, must be open to revision 
and, therefore, may be recognised as historically biased. 
IV 
Finally, I would like to go over some of the points defended in this paper: 
In the first place I analysed the structure of understanding as an open 
dialogue between two subjects who are committed to partially sharetl 
networks of assumptions, and in which the determination of what the other' 
says can be carried out only by determining its coherence and truth. 'L'his 
analysis allowed us to reject full-blooded relativism since the identification 
of alien belief systems, with particular criteria of rationality, is possible 
only if we assume the existence of a rationality that is paftially shared by 
the interpreter and the subject to be interpreted. On the other hand we 
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have attempted to show that positivist ant hropology failed to appreciate 
that its own conception of reality was historically defined. I have also 
main tained that the structure of an open d ia logue, which is proper to 
understanding, is reproduced in every cognit ive process; since every 
identification of reality depends on determining the truth of statements, 
a nd this, in turn, can only be understood as the culmi nation of the open 
dia logue which characterizes u nderstanding. As a result of this, we spoke 
of the cogniti ve universality of understanding. 
Secondly, I a rgued that cognitive processes cannot be reduced to causal 
relations inasmuch as we cann o t ide ntify them in pure ly physical terms a nd 
the n go on to establish nomo logical causal re lations between them and 
other physical events. Nor does it seem plausible to claim that nomological 
causal relations can be set up between events identified by physical criteria 
and events identified by criteria of rationality. However I have accepted 
the possibility of making generalizations, with an indeterminable degree of 
probability, to link up parts or structures of the brain with o ur linguistic 
abilities. F inally, I show th at it is possible to in terpret Davidson's 
anomalous monism so that it is compa tible with my analysis of the structure 
of understanding and with the thesis of its cognitive universality, in spite 
of Davidson's commitment to the ontological universality of causal 
relations. 10 
NOTES 
1 Evans-Pritchard (1935). 
2 At this point, Evans-Pritchard (1934) refers basically to Levy-Bruhl. I wish 
however to explain briefly wha t I understand by the expression 'a basicall y 
contradictory system of thought' . We can consider the beliefs of a system of 
thought as being logically interrelated, and establish a gradual distinction 
between those beliefs which arc central and those which arc peripheral. The 
most central bclicfs·constitutc the logical foundations of the more peripheral 
beliefs. The sense of the expression 'logical foundation' will vary according to 
the different theories of meaning. Thus a rationalist will view the central beliefs 
as the premises from which the more peripheral beliefs are derived, whereas a 
pragmatico-holistic approach will regard the more central beliefs as the basis 
upon which the more peripheral beliefs acquire meaning. 
In the light of this distinction between central and peripheral beliefs we can 
say that an interpretation which presents a system of thought as basically 
contradictory is one which views the most central beliefs of that system as being 
mutually contradictory. 
3 In developing the arguments which close this section and those which appear in 
section II, I have taken ideas principally from Wittgenstcin (1960), Gadamcr 
(1960), Habermas (1983), and Davidson (1984). 
4 This approach does not preclude the possibility of showing that certain 
philosophical positions are self-refuting because the ideas that a philosopher 
upholds form a specific sub-system of beliefs within a broader system to which 
the philosopher is committed in non-philosophical contexts. Consequently, 
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claiming that a philosophical position is self-refuting does not force one to 
present a subject's global belief system as basically contradictory. 
5 Quine (1960), pp. 223. 
6 It may be interesting at this point to recall paragraph 17 of the Monadology of 
Leibniz: 
And supposing that there were a machine so constructed as to think, feel, 
and have perception, we could conceive of it as enlarged and yet preserving 
the same proportions, so that we might enter it as into a mill. And this 
granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push against .. 
another, but never anything by which to explain perception. This must be 
sought for, therefore, in the simple substance and not in the composite or in 
the machine. 
7 Searle (1983), p. 135. 
8 op. cit., p. 271-2. 
9 At this point I think it is important to take into account the following comment 
of Putnam (1962): 
It is perfectly rational to make stipulations to the effect that certain 
statements are never to be given up, and those stipulations remain 
stipulations to that effect, notwithstanding the fact that under certain 
circumstances the stipulations themselves might be given up. (p. 60) 
I examine this problem at length in my paper 'Are all statements revisable?' 
(unpublished). 
j_ 
10 I am very grateful to my colleagues J. L. Prades, C. Moya and V . Sanfelix for 
comments on the first versions of this paper. I made important changes as a . 
result of their comments. I am also much obliged to E. Turner for his translation ' 
into English of my original Spanish version. 
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